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L EXPERIENCE RATING
A. Introduction
In the contemporary context of workers' compensation in Canada,
there is probably nothing that is so fervently supported or so little
understood as experience rating. Proposals for the widespread expansion
of experience rating have been made and adopted, yet with no analysis
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of the consequences and with no reasons being given that could withstand
serious reflection. It is as if a political steam-roller has made the widespread
expansion of experience rating a part of inevitable destiny regardless
of the consequences. In this climate, any questioning of the movement
might be seen as irrelevant, perhaps even recalcitrant. Nevertheless, the
aim of this paper is to contribute to an understanding of the significance
of experience rating.
Our workers' compensation systems derive their primary revenue
from assessments levied on employers. For calculating the amounts, the
boards use an industrial classification system that allocates each em-
ployment to a class and often to a sub-class or rate group. A standard
rate for that sub-class or group is established annually and expressed
in terms of a dollar amount per one hundred dollars of payroll, with
a maximum per worker. Where an experience rating plan is applied,
the rate of assessment for each employer may be higher or lower than
the standard rate for the sub-class or rate group. The variation is made
pursuant to a formula which reflects the claims cost experience of the
employer, though it may also reflect other factors. For example, there
may sometimes be a frequency component in the formula. Also, an average
or standard figure may be used for fatal cases instead of the actual cost.
For the most part, however, experience rating means that the assessment
payable by each employer is subject to annual variation above or below
the standard rate for the sub-class or group by reference to the claims
cost experience of that employer.
Experience rating is often referred to as a species of 'merit rating,'
and the formulae that are used commonly refer to 'merit' and 'demerit'
points. However, these terms are misleading. Experience rating does not
reflect any mode of measuring any type of merit.
Exactly why a demand for the expansion of experience rating has
been in vogue among corporate organizations is not entirely clear. It
may be credible, however, that part of the explanation could lie in a
false impression that employers have received from the figures supplied
to them by some of the boards. In at least some jurisdictions, an employer
receives a cost statement, often monthly, which shows the direct com-
pensation costs, including medical aid costs, paid by the board in respect
of each employee or former employee of that employer. The statement
does not, however, show any apportionment of the other costs incurred
by the board. For example, it may not include any apportionment of
the cost of health and safety programs, rehabilitation services, allocations
to the Second Injury Fund, the disaster reserve or other reserves, the
administrative overhead, or any allowance for inflation in respect of future
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benefits for past claims., Thus, if a company compares what appears
from the cost statement to be the aggregate cost of the claims of its
employees with the aggregate amount being paid by the company in
assessments, it may well appear that the company is paying far too much.
Moreover, this will appear to be the case for most employers. The truth
may well be that the real aggregate cost attributable to the company
could be equal to or greater than the aggregate amount that the company
is paying in assessments.
There is no doubt that many employers are under the impression
that they are paying far too much in relation to the costs attributable
to them, and false impressions drawn from these cost statements may
be part of the explanation. Moreover, if the majority of employers believe
that they are paying relatively too much in assessments, the belief would
logically follow that some other employers are paying relatively too little,
and this may well help to explain the demand for an expansion in
experience rating.
B. Claims Control
Since experience rating involves the variation of an employer's rate
of assessment by reference to recorded claims cost experience, it creates
an incentive for the company to reduce its recorded claims cost experience.
The easiest way of doing this will usually be by a program of claims
monitoring and control.
The claims control practices that seem to be used most frequently
are commonly legitimate. Probably the main form of control is for an
employer to protest a claim or the continuation of benefits, or to appeal
claims decisions. Unfortunately, there seems to be an increasing danger
of employer protests becoming a normal routine, and hence reintroducing
into workers' compensation the delays, the costs, and the therapeutic
damage of the adversary system. Incidentally, in my experience as
chairman of the Workers' Compensation Board in British Columbia during
the years 1973-76, employer opposition to claims was rare except in
classes covered by experience rating, or among those that were self-
insured.
Of course the monitoring of claims by employers is not always
injurious. Like so many things in life, a certain amount of it can be
beneficial while too much of it can be damaging. The problem with
current systems of experience rating is that they promote the monitoring
I Obviously, the cost statements should include an apportionment of these figures.
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of claims by employers without creating any incentive to stop at the
right amount.
Some of the more objectionable practices that have been adopted
to reduce recorded claims cost experience include the following:
1. Discouraging workers from reporting claims.
2. Refusing to complete a Form 7 (employer's report to the W.C.B.)
when requested to do so. This can be particularly important in Ontario
where the Form 6 (worker's report to the W.C.B.) is not generally used
and is commonly unavailable to workers.
3. Adopting a gimmick type of safety program which creates
incentives for lower levels of management, or perhaps even for workers,
to reduce recorded claims, possibly by creating peer group influence not
to make a claim.
4. Delaying the completion of forms or omitting relevant information,
thereby causing delays in the processing of a claim, perhaps causing
the worker to turn to other sources of income.
5. Other practices mentioned under the headings that follow.
The extent of these nefarious practices is unknown, but they are
not rare events. Also the first attempt at any survey work on this confirms
that these practices tend to be associated with experience rating.2
Moreover, it would be unrealistic to suggest that where experience rating
is used, these practices can be prevented by any kind of policing activity.
Perhaps a solution that might seem ideal would be to recognize
that while experience rating is of no use for safety purposes, it could
have some beneficial influence on claims adjudication by encouraging
employers to take an interest in claims, and to supply information to
the boards. If this goal were to be sought, however, without risking the
negative consequences mentioned in this article, the rate variations would
have to be very small.
There are two basic problems with this idea. One is that as a matter
of practical politics, this type of experience rating program would not
be adopted. Secondly, even if adopted, it would be open to the objection
that, like present experience rating plans, it would create an incentive
for employers to provide only adverse information. One would think
that fairness to workers should require employers to be under an equal
incentive to provide any positive information, particularly when the
information is of a type that is not readily available to workers.
Another possibility might be to allow an assessment credit wherever
an employer provides any substantial information to the board beyond
2 C. Walker, "A Labour Perspective" (Third Annual Workers' Compensation Conference on
Experience Rating: Incentive or Disincentives, 16-17 September 1986) (Toronto: Corpus, 1986).
[VOL 24 No. 4
Significance of Experience Rating
the basic requirements of the Form 7. It is doubtful, however, whether
this would be practicable.
C. The Influence on Health and Safety
The argument most commonly used to justify experience rating is
that it will promote occupational health and safety by providing an
incentive to care. There is no difficulty in finding superficial support
for that view.3 It is assumed and asserted that the variation of assessment
rates by reference to the safety performance of the firms concerned will
create an incentive to improve the safety performance. Of course if the
rates really were being varied by reference to safety performance the
conclusion would follow; but as explained above, that is not the case.
Rates are varied by reference to claims cost experience and other claims
data, and variations in these figures will commonly have nothing to do
with safety performance.
Thus it is no surprise that in spite of decades of discussion on this
subject, there is no empirical evidence to support the view that experience
rating really does create an incentive to care. Indeed, such empirical
evidence as there is suggests the contrary. The conclusion, with regard
to safety performance, is that: "It appears, then, that experience-rating,
or the lack of it, in workers' compensation has no observable effect
on employer behavior.",
Part of the explanation is that accidents involve a cost for employers
that is probably far in excess of workers' compensation assessments. There
is, therefore, another economic incentive for the prevention of accidents
that is more significant than experience rating; and that is probably enough
to induce most employers to adopt the easy ways of reducing accidents,
regardless of experience rating. If a company is not adopting further
measures, it is probably because they would involve a high cost, and
sometimes because their adoption might make the business uneconomical.
Where that is so, a marginal shift in the workers' compensation assessment
rate is not going to produce an improvement.
Another difficulty is that many and perhaps even most occupational
disabilities result from disease rather than trauma, and with regard to
the more serious diseases, experience rating can be of no benefit. These
involve long latency periods, commonly in the range of 10 to 25 years,
3 See, for example, Report of the Royal Commision on the Economic Union and Development
Prospects for Canada, vol. 2 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1985) at 728.
4 J.R. Chelius & R.S. Smith, "Experience-Rating and Injury Prevention" in J.D. Worrall, ed.,
Safely and the Work Force: Incentives and Disincentives in Workers' Compensation (Ithaca: ILR Press,
1983) 128 at 136.
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so that any incentive to care that depended upon claims' cost experience
would be a long time in coming. Also serious disease cases often involve
difficulties in attributing the etiology of the disease to employment with
any particular employer. For these and other reasons, some experience
rating plans omit claims for disease. Thus if experience rating had any
influence at all on health and safety, it could be only to divert attention
to physical hazards and away from the control of toxic contamination.
The historical use of experience rating might be another indicator
of its significance. Experience rating has been associated with high levels
of risk and with relatively high rates of assessment. For example, in
British Columbia, health and safety problems have been endemic in the
forest industry, in mining, and in construction; the same classes of industry
to which experience rating has been applied for decades. Of course this
does not prove that experience rating has been of no benefit, or that
it has been harmful, but it contributes to a certain skepticism.
Also, despite decades of experience rating for certain classes of
industry, there has never appeared a real conviction within the boards
that it has had any beneficial influence on health and safety. This lack
of conviction appears from the decisions relating to the classes of industry
to which experience rating is applied. It has generally been applied only
to classes of industry in respect of which there has been a request from
an employers' organization or a vote among the employers to have
experience rating. The boards have simply acquiesced in the wishes of
employers or their organizations. If there was any conviction that
experience rating really did have a beneficial influence on occupational
health and safety, one might have expected that the boards would have
applied it to all classes years ago and regardless of employer wishes.
Even the theoretical argument involves a non-sequitur. If the as-
sessment rates payable by employers are varied by reference to the
recorded claims cost experience of each employer, that obviously creates
an incentive to reduce the recorded claims cost experience. There are
several ways of doing that, some of which have already been mentioned,
that are probably easier and cheaper to adopt than any further measures
for the improvement of health and safety.
The assertion that experience rating has a beneficial influence on
occupational health and safety, or at least on safety, is contrary to the
evidence and unsupported by logic. Moreover, the position is worse than
that. Experience rating probably has negative influences on health and
safety. For example, if a rate variation really is wide enough to have
a significant impact upon an employer, a possible reaction may be to
contract out some of the more hazardous types of work. When this happens,
the work may be undertaken by smaller employers or independent
[VOL 24 No. 4
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operators who lack the technical knowledge or the capital to use the
safest methods and equipment, and who may operate under competitive
pressures to incur greater risks.
Another perverse influence that experience rating has on health and
safety relates to the use of statistical data. The common assumption that
experience rating promotes safety assumes and asserts a correlation
between claims data and accidents. Invariably in the literature of
experience rating, claims data are used as if they were incidence data.
Even in government publications, claims data are often used to produce
"accident rates" without any apparent recognition that the data show
no such thing. Also, the adoption of an experience rating program may
require, as a matter of practical politics, the adoption of a theory or
mythology that will justify its existence. That mythology is one which
assumes a correlation between claims data and the incidence of accidents.
Such a correlation will never exist exactly, and the extent of the deviation
will never be known. The crucial point, however, is that experience rating
itself creates an incentive to reduce the recorded claims experience, and
it is almost bound to increase the deviation between accidents and recorded
claims. Hence experience rating creates a demand for claims data to
be used as if they were accident data while at the same time it makes
them infinitely less reliable for that purpose. Moreover, since other
programs of accident prevention commonly have no statistical data base
except for claims figures, experience rating tends to promote distortions
in the data base that is most commonly used for other programs of
accident prevention.
There is another way too in which experience rating can have a
negative influence on health and safety. Experience rating encourages
a company to compare its rate of assessment with the standard rate
for the sub-class, or with the rates being paid by other companies. If
senior management believe that this comparison is a measure of safety
performance, it may be seen as a rough measure of the efficiency of
the company safety officer. Since claims costs can often be reduced more
readily by the monitoring of claims than by measures to reduce risk,
a company safety officer may be encouraged to spend time on claims
monitoring rather than on safety activity. Indeed, in companies that have
been subject to experience rating, it has not been too unusual to find
a company safety officer spending more time in the claims division of
a compensation board than he could possibly be spending on any safety
activity. This is understandable. As well as the incentive of experience
rating, part of the explanation is that the background and status of a
company safety officer, as well as the economic and political pressures,
make it easier for him to deal with workers than with senior management.
19861
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To the extent that he deals with safety matters, a typical company
safety officer does not have the status or engineering background, or
the authority within the company, to give direction to senior management
with regard to the key determinants of risk (for example, plant location,
plant design, choice of product, choice of materials, choice of equipment,
etcetera). A company safety officer does, however, usually have a measure
of status and authority to deal with workers and with lower levels of
management. Hence, any safety activity may be focused on exhortation
to these groups, including the use of personal protective equipment. Since
the response to experience rating is considered a matter for the company
safety officer, it may in this way tend to divert attention away from
the ways of improving safety performance that have the greatest potential
and towards those that are the least efficient.
D. The Therapeutic Significance
As mentioned above, experience rating encourages employers to
establish routines for the scrutiny of every compensation claim. The
incentive created, however, is not for an impartial scrutiny or open-ended
enquiry, but for a partisan scrutiny. Experience rating creates an incentive
to develop only negative information to disallow or to minimize a claim.
These routines with this motivation are almost bound to generate within
the company attitudes of suspicion towards claimants, and such attitudes
are likely to be sensed by claimants. They cause anxiety and resentment,
and their impact on the vulnerable psychological state of an injured worker
can increase the gravity of a disability.
Related to this, the system must obviously include the detection and
investigation of fraud; but if therapeutic damage is not to be inflicted
upon legitimate claimants, the prevention of fraud must not be sought
through a program that results in all claimants being treated with suspicion.
The monitoring for fraud should be done by people who have an incentive,
or at least a duty, to distinguish fraudulent from legitimate claims, not
by people upon whom there is imposed an economic incentive to defeat
or minimize any claim, however legitimate.
By promoting more suspicion and challenge in relation to claims,
experience rating can also increase the number of physicians by whom
a claimant is examined, again with therapeutic harm. Indeed, it is well
recognized in medical literature that an unnecessary increase in the number
of physicians by whom a patient is examined is a cause of psychological
damage, and sometimes even of physical harm.s
5 For further discussion of this, see T.G. Ison, "The Therapeutic Significance of Compensation
Structures" (1986) 64 Can. B. Rev. 605.
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It may help to reflect on what commonly happens in a fairly typical
bad back case. Consider the example of a worker who is 48 years old
and has worked for the last 30 years in heavy industry. He may well
be an immigrant who is not entirely fluent in English. In any event,
he does not have the educational background or training for office work.
The physique of the worker was never above average in the first place,
and he finds it increasingly difficult to cope with heavy manual work.
The accident happens. When making a lift, the worker suddenly
feels an excruciating pain in the back. There is no obvious cause, and
the pain continues after the load has been dropped. The worker feels
crippled and may even have a fear of paraplegia. He feels that his capacity
to earn a living in the only way that he has ever known is threatened.
Work-mates are bewildered. There is nothing visibly wrong and they
can offer no comfort. Someone, perhaps the foreman, perhaps a company
doctor, tells the worker that it's nothing serious and that after a rest
he will soon feel better, but the worker knows that this opinion does
not reflect any diagnosis, and for that reason, it is not reassuring. The
reaction at home may be sympathetic or resentful, but either way, it
offers no solution to what the worker sees as a crisis in his life. That
night, and on successive nights, the pain is aggravated by muscle spasms,
and even when the spasms abate, the pain continues.
In the ensuing days or weeks, some people, perhaps at the company
or at a workers' compensation board, begin to treat the worker with
suspicion. Even the attending physician, who may be well disposed towards
him, only seems to offer modest suggestions for treatment, with no clear
diagnosis and no promise of cure. At the same time, any recreational
activity is in suspense and social life is impaired.
The compensation claim then becomes more controversial and more
adversarial. The workers' credibility is questioned, perhaps by a company
official of perhaps by a board doctor. Meanwhile, the worker is convinced
that his disability needs more recognition and a better response than
it is receiving. Understandably, the worker begins to exaggerate his
symptoms. Comments about "functional overlay" then begin to appear
on the claims file, and the worker recognizes that some people in authority
are coming to perceive of his problem as primarily psychological. This
adds to his anxiety and resentment for four reasons:
1. It is an ill-informed and insinuating response.
2. It seems like the introduction of an excuse to terminate com-
pensation benefits and leave the worker in financial despair.
3. It seems to indicate the abandonment of any attempt to identify
an organic cause of the disability, and thus seems to import also the
abandonment of any hope of cure.
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4. Labelling the condition as wholly or partly psychological is a
stigma that could prejudice the future employment prospects of the worker.
Partly for these reasons, the ostensible diagnosis of "functional
overlay" adds to the anxiety, aggravates the pain, and tends to entrench
the disability.
We then have the classic bad back patient who sees himself, perhaps
correctly, as the victim of a serious disability, of professional ineptitude,
and of a gross injustice.
Of course this classic syndrome is not caused wholly or primarily
by experience rating. A primary cause is the difficulty of diagnosis in
bad back cases. Another cause is our failure to develop a system of
alternative employment opportunities for people who have reached a
stage in life at which heavy manual work has become too much for
them. Nevertheless, a significant contributing cause is the suspicious
attitudes and the adversarial postures that experience rating tends to
promote.
What is usually needed in these bad back cases is a solution to
the problem. Experience rating tends to stimulate only aggravations.
Much of the concern relates to the impact of experience rating on
the practice of occupational medicine. If a company doctor is playing
an active role in diagnosis and treatment, the judgments made in this
process will inevitably have an impact on compensation costs. If the
company is on experience rating, it would not be unnatural if at least
some people in some companies should harbour the expectation that
the company doctor will rank it as one of his responsibilities to reduce
compensation costs as much as possible. Indeed, some company doctors
appear to adopt that view, and to proclaim the guarding of corporate
finances as their primary role, rather than the guarding of workers' health.6
If a company doctor is concerned about the cost of disabilities to the
company, this may well add to the anxieties of patients, and it may
tend to result in patients being treated with the suspicious attitudes that
promote chronic pain syndrome.7
Experience rating can also lead to breaches in the confidentiality
of the relationship of doctor and patient. Since the company has an interest
in the return of an injured worker to work as soon as possible, it also
has an interest in questioning the gravity of a disability. Thus, in industries
that are on experience rating, it is fairly common for someone in the
company to communicate with the attending physician to inquire about
6 See for example, Brief of the Occupational Health Section of the O.M.A. to the Task Force
on the Workmen's Compensation Board of Ontario, 23 May 1973.
7 See for example, L. Keiser, The Traumatic Neurosis (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1968)
at 69 and Ison, supra, note 5.
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the gravity of the disability and often to suggest a return to light work.
If this is done in the presence and with the approval of the worker,
it can be a constructive move in rehabilitation. However, where it is
done behind the back of the worker, it can be another cause of anxiety,
and hence of therapeutic damage. In any event, it can impair the
confidentiality of medical information.
E. The Influence on Rehabilitation
The influence of experience rating on rehabilitation is also dubious.
It can provide an incentive to employers to offer further employment
to disabled workers, but even this can be counter-productive, particularly
in cases involving a significant and long-term disability. If experience
rating creates a pressure to provide future employment for a disabled
worker, that pressure is applied only for a limited time. The estimated
future cost of each claim is capitalized within two or three years of
the date of injury and charged to the class funds. Thereafter, the future
employment of that worker will not be reflected in the rate of assessment
payable by the employer. Thus, if an employer has provided future
employment only as a response to the influence of experience rating,
there is an obvious risk that the employment may not last much beyond
the time when the claim is capitalized at the board and that influence
comes to an end.
Moreover, experience rating lacks the sensitivity to distinguish
between genuine and phoney rehabilitation programs. Thus, in industries
that are on experience rating, there is episodic evidence of unsavory
practices, including:
1. Keeping people on the payroll who were injured at work, even
though they are not reporting for work, and failing to report the injury
to the W.C.B. (This can create a problem in establishing a claim if the
injury does not heal).
2. Pressing claimants to return to work too soon.
3. Requiring claimants to report for work as a form of harassment
or degradation when there is no work available that they are fit to do.
4. Creating "light work" programs which do not involve genuine
work at all, or which only involve work that is unsuitable for the condition
of the claimant.
5. Pressing an attending physician to certify a claimant "fit for light
work."
Where these practices have been found or alleged, it has usually
been in industries that are covered by experience rating or that are self-
insured.8
8 See supra, note 2.
1986]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
Some rehabilitation programs are not clearly genuine or phoney
but somewhere between the two. Senior management may be well
motivated in introducing a rehabilitation program that is intended to
be genuine, and it may have support within the company from those
with primary responsibility for rehabilitation. When an injured worker
returns to work, however, the supervision is by junior line management
personnel who may be unsympathetic to the program and reluctant to
recognize the limitations on the activity of the worker that recovery from
the injury requires. This can be particularly noticeable where the re-
habilitation of the worker requires his transfer to another department
of the company.
Also for optimum success, a rehabilitation program must be one
that has the confidence of the worker, and this may be hard to promote
if the worker knows that the employer has a financial interest in a
rehabilitation proposal which is different from and may conflict with
the interest of the worker. There is then an obvious risk that the worker
will feel that he is being manipulated. He may suspect that the employer's
judgments on such matters as the suitability of particular work to the
condition of the worker are being made in the interest of the employer
rather than in the interest of the worker. The confidence of the worker,
which is so important to sound rehabilitation, is most likely to be inspired
when an employer has no conflicting or potentially conflicting interest.
Of course it does not follow that financial incentives should never
be used for rehabilitation. The point being made is that experience rating
is too clumsy and insensitive for this role. Financial incentives for
rehabilitation should be planned carefully for that purpose, and usually
planned for the circumstances of a particular case.
Even if experience rating has any beneficial influence with regard
to further employment with the injury employer, it can have a negative
influence with regard to the prospects of future employment with other
employers. This is particularly so in bad back cases. In industries that
are on experience rating, the compensation claims records of applicants
for employment are often a matter of concern to potential employers.
With an expansion of experience rating, one would expect an expansion
in the enquiries made by potential employers about previous W.C.B. claims
by job applicants. This practice can be a negative influence on the hiring
of people who have claimed Workers' compensation.
F. Equity Among Employers
The strongest argument for experience rating is that it might achieve
a more equitable distribution of cost among employers. It can help to
enhance the industrial classification system in providing that companies
[VOL 24 No. 4
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operating at higher levels of compensation cost pay proportionately more
than those operating at lower levels of compensation cost. Even here,
however, there is cause for concern. First, the lower levels of cost may
be achieved in ways that are unrelated to the risk of injury or to genuine
rehabilitation, and as mentioned above, experience rating rewards the
anti-social ways of reducing cost as well as the beneficial ways. Moreover,
since there are other incentives to adopt the beneficial ways of reducing
cost, experience rating is more likely to promote the anti-social methods.
Secondly, experience rating introduces new inequities. In particular,
it redistributes cost in a way that favours large corporations against small
employers. It is normal in experience rating plans to exclude small
employers, or to include them in a more limited way, perhaps using
a more limited rate variation for small employers. This would not
necessarily prejudice small employers if an experience rating plan operated
in a state of balance, that is, if the 'merits' equalled the 'demerits,' so
that the standard rate was unaffected.
Usually it is part of the aspiration of an experience rating plan that
it will operate in balance in this way. However, more complaints are
likely to arise from the award of "demerits" than from the award of
'merits.' The responses of the boards to those complaints sometimes
produce an excess of 'merit' over 'demerit' points, thus causing a rise
in the standard rate. When that happens, there is a cross-subsidy to large
corporations from small employers who are not on the experience rating
plan, or who are on the plan to a more limited extent.
The other distortion arises from the monitoring of claims. Large
corporations commonly employ personnel for this purpose while smaller
companies do not. This monitoring includes not only opposition to claims
and the use of appeal processes, but also applications for the transfer
of costs to the Second Injury Fund. To the extent that these applications
succeed, the cost of those claims is distributed over all employers. Thus,
these applications too create a cross-subsidy from smaller employers to
larger corporations.
G. The Influence on Perceptions of the Coverage
Experience rating can produce or aggravate misconceptions with
regard to the coverage of the Acts, thereby causing confusion in claims
adjudication as well as in political processes.
It was the essence of our system of workers' compensation that
benefits were to be payable automatically for disabilities resulting from
employment. It was to be irrelevant whether a disability resulted from
any fault on the part of the employer, and at least in serious disability
and fatal cases, it was to be irrelevant whether a disability or death
resulted from any fault on the part of the worker.
1986]
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Experience rating, however, tends to produce a narrower perception
of what the coverage is or ought to be. The ostensiblejustification generally
used for experience rating is the assertion that it will create an incentive
for the reduction of accidents. It is implicit in this that accidents resulting
in compensation claims can be reduced at the choice of employers if
they have the incentive. It almost, though not quite, follows from this
that compensation claims, to be valid, should relate to accidents that
are the fault of an employer. Whether or not this is the explanation,
it is common to find in industries that are on experience rating that
claims are opposed on the ground that the disability resulted from the
fault of the worker, or alternatively, that it resulted from circumstances
outside the control of the employer. While these contentions are legally
irrelevant and are not generally accepted by compensation boards, the
raising of such objections creates unnecessary controversy and delay in
the payment of claims, with consequential risks of psychological damage
to the workers concerned, as well as increased administrative overhead.
Where arguments of this kind fail as objections to the validity of
a claim, they are sometimes re-asserted on an application to transfer
the cost of the claim to the Second Injury Fund, or to some other general
fund that will disperse the cost among other employers.
Thus in these ways too, experience rating contributes to misunder-
standings and controversies in claims adjudication, to therapeutic damage,
to higher administrative costs, and to inequities in the distribution of
cost among employers.
H. The Influence on Costs
As explained above, the ostensible justification for experience rating
is usually the assertion that it will reduce accidents, and that therefore
and incidentally, it will reduce compensation costs. For the reasons
explained above, that is not so. If an experience rating plan has any
downward influence on costs, it is likely to be through the discouragement
of claims, opposition to claims, and the confinement of benefits.
There are, however, several ways in which experience rating can
increase the aggregate cost of compensation. First, there is the cost of
operating the plan itself. The technical part, for example the computer
programming, is relatively simple and cheap. Much of the other cost,
however, is unrecorded. There is, for example, the cost of discussions
relating to the design of the plan and the cost of ongoing explanations.
There is also the cost of dealing with complaints about the administration
of the plan, and the cost of dealing with the additional applications for
transfers to the Second Injury Fund.
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Secondly, there is the increase in cost that is caused by making
claims administration and adjudication processes more controversial and
more adversarial. Indeed, a veritable army of professionals and para-
professionals has been spawned to deal with these controversies, and
this is in addition to the time of internal company personnel. Part of
this cost will appear as an addition to workers' compensation assessments,
but a large part of the cost will be borne directly by employers, and
by unions and other services acting on behalf of workers.
Thirdly, there are the costs resulting from the increase in the incidence
of disablement (the therapeutic damage done by promoting broad-scale
suspicion in claims administration, and by making adjudication more
controversial and adversarial). Part of this cost will appear as an addition
to workers' compensation assessments, and part may be reflected in
payments from welfare and other sources.
Fourthly, there are the spill-over effects, such as the negative influence
on labour relations.
Fifthly, experience rating fits into the same conceptual framework
as full funding. Hence its adoption tends to impede any move towards
current cost financing, a move which could enable the system to operate
at lower overall cost in the long run, at least in Ontario and Quebec.
Finally, experience rating generates ongoing political pressures for
the reduction of benefits and other restrictions on claims. These pressures
inspire counter-pressures, with the result that ongoing political contro-
versies create extra costs at the boards and elsewhere.
It may well be partly for these reasons that the assumed beneficial
influence of experience rating has not been found in practice. For example,
the industries to which experience rating has been applied in Canada
have commonly been industries with relatively high assessment rates.
Of course this does not prove that the higher rates resulted from experience
rating. These industries have been high hazard industries. Nevertheless,
it is at least a plausible possibility that experience rating may have
contributed to the higher rates.
Again, some compensation boards in Canada have used experience
rating fairly broadly while others have not used it at all. Yet I have
never heard it suggested that a multi-jurisdictional comparison would
show that experience rating has resulted in lower overall costs.
The New Zealand experience is also food for thought. New Zealand
does not have experience rating. The average rate of assessment paid
by employers in New Zealand is 77 cents per $100 of assessable payroll
(though it would be about $1.21 if it were not for a transitory adjustment
to reserves). At either of those figures, the average rate of assessment
is much lower than in workers' compensation in Canada. Moreover, the
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coverage is in many respects broader than in Canada. In particular, it
is not confined to disabilities resulting from employment. Of course
international comparisons of this kind are notoriously difficult, and of
course the lower rates might be explained by other factors. This com-
parison is not proof that experience rating results in higher costs; but
it is another cause for skepticism about any assertion that experience
rating results in lower costs.
It is also important to bear in mind here that workers' compensation
in Canada came about in the first place at the initiative of employers
largely because of discontent with the old system of employers' liability.
There was also dissatisfaction with that system among workers and unions.
Employers' liability involved the delays, the formalities, the controversies,
and the enormous administrative costs of the adversary process, which
workers' compensation was intended to abolish. That system also involved
experience rating.
L Success Measurement
After the implementation of an experience rating plan, it is common
to proclaim that its adoption has been a success. Such claims are manifestly
unwarranted. No experience rating program has ever been introduced
in Canada (or elsewhere to my knowledge) in conjunction with any
research that would even attempt any measure of its significance.
One problem is the difficulty of developing a research design that
will control for the concurrent operation of other variables that might
affect claims records. There is also the difficulty of obtaining any injury
or accident figures that are independent of claims.
Another problem is that there is no way of measuring the harm
that is done by experience rating, or at least no method that has any
hope of being used in practice. Thus, it is possible for a system of experience
rating to be inflicting the most horrendous damage and yet for it to
appear within a compensation board that the system is operating smoothly.
Most of the damage would occur outside the board, and it would not
readily be attributed to experience rating as the cause. To the extent
that the damage occurs within a board, most of it would occur outside
the department that is administering the experience rating plan, and again,
most of it would not readily be attributed to experience rating as the
cause.
J. Conclusions on Experience Rating
Of course the problems mentioned above can be mitigated or
aggravated by the choices made in the detail of the formula, but there
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is no formula that will avoid the problems, or that can even achieve
a substantial reduction.
To sum up my thoughts on experience rating:
- Its overall influence on occupational health and safety is probably
negative;
- It causes therapeutic harm, increasing the gravity of disabilities;
- Its influence on rehabilitation is probably beneficial in some
circumstances, but in aggregate and on balance, is probably negative;
- Its influence on the efficiency of claims administration and on
the quality of adjudication is negative.
It is uncertain whether experience rating increases or decreases the
level of workers' compensation assessments, but it certainly increases
the other costs of occupational disablement.
It may contribute to equity in the distribution of costs among
employers, but any benefit in terms of equity is vastly outweighed by
the other negative effects, and experience rating also creates some new
inequities.
Experience rating is contrary to the public interest, contrary to the
interests of workers, and probably contrary to the interests of employers,
or at least the majority of employers. The only clear benefit of experience
rating is the contribution that it makes to the prosperity of the professions.
The expansion of experience rating has not resulted from any research
to assess the significance of what is being done. Instead, economists using
nineteenth century market theory provide the ostensiblejustification, board
actuaries or outside actuarial firms provide the charisma of 'professional'
authenticity, the compensation boards provide the technology, corporate
organisations provide the political clout to ensure that it happens, and
the legal and medical professions apply their skills to cope with the
resulting controversies.
Part of the problem is that our structures for system development
in relation to workers' compensation have deteriorated in recent years.
They have become more political and less analytical. In particular, we
have not had a royal commission on workers' compensation for two
decades, and major system changes are being made without any real
analysis of the significance of what is being done.
Needless to say, these conclusions relate only to experience rating
in the context of workers' compensation. Different considerations would
apply to the use of experience rating in relation to, for example, automobile
insurance, or a comprehensive plan of compensation for disablement.
1986]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
II. OTHER FINANCIAL INCENTIVES TO CARE
A. Introduction
A conclusion that experience rating has a negative influence on
occupational health and safety does not mean that workers' compensation
cannot provide financial incentives to care. Indeed, there are several ways
in which workers' compensation has been so used, or in which it might
be used, and which are summarized below.
B. A Token Safety Audit
An employer might be allowed an assessment credit on the result
of a safety audit of a nominal or token nature. For example, points may
be awarded for having a safety committee, having certain notices in
place, and having personal protective equipment available. A safety audit
of this type only indicates whether an employer is making certain nominal
gestures. It may or may not indicate real safety performance. For this
reason, it is a waste of resources as well as being potentially counter-
productive and unfair in distributing compensation costs among employ-
ers. It can also divert attention from real achievement in health and
safety.
C. A Real Safety Audit
Another possibility is a variation in assessment rates based on real
safety audits. For example, the audit might include a scrutiny of the
design of plant, the choices and uses of machinery and equipment, the
existence and control of toxic substances, and a testing of emergency
procedures. Something on these lines has been undertaken by insurance
companies in a limited range of situations, such as the off-shore drilling
rigs. It is not practicable, however, for safety audits of this type to be
undertaken by a workers' compensation board among the general range
of employers.
What is practicable is for an audit to be undertaken in respect of
a particular hazard that is of significant concern at the time, so that
at least that hazard can be reduced. For example, in 1974 the Workers'
Compensation Act in British Columbia was amended to provide that the
Board may vary the rate of assessment as between different employers
or levy supplementary assessments according to the estimated exposure
of workers to industrial noise.9 The implementation of that section was
halted in 1976. Such realistic incentives for the protection of workers'
health appear to have little prospect of survival in the political process.
9 Workmens' Compensation Amendment Act 1974, S.B.C. 1974, c. 101, s. 24A, adding s. 40A
to the principal Act.
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D. Penalty Assessments by Reference to Claims Experience
In Ontario, the Board can and does levy a penalty assessment where
the claims experience of an employer is consistently much greater than
the average experience for the rate group. There is anecdotal evidence
that this type of penalty assessment provides an incentive to improve
safety performance by the companies upon which the assessment has
been levied, or where a company is coming very close to such an
assessment. It is arguable, however, that the system is counter-productive
by creating a disincentive to care before the situation has become extreme.
Also, it is open to many of the same objections as experience rating.
For example, the company may respond by an increasingly negative
posture towards claims rather than by improving safety, and there is
anecdotal evidence that companies do sometimes respond in this way.
Also, this type of penalty assessment is of no use for the prevention
of serious disease.
E. Penalty Assessments by Reference to Observed Conditions
The most promising use of workers' compensation assessments as
an incentive to care is the imposition of penalty assessments by reference
to observed conditions.
Since these assessments are a direct response to the existence of
hazardous conditions, they cannot be avoided by any manipulation of
claims.
These penalty assessments do not involve the same administrative
or political problems as real safety audits, and since all employers are
not being assessed contemporaneously, there are not the same problems
of equity among employers. Of course an assessment might be imposed
upon one employer as a response to hazardous conditions while similar
conditions at another place of employment may not have been discovered,
but that risk is inherent in almost any program of law enforcement.
In criminal proceedings, for example, it is no defence that other offenders
have not been caught.
Given the limited range of circumstances in which prosecutions can
be useful, penalty assessments of this type are the only sanction that
can be used on any broad scale for the enforcement of occupational
health and safety requirements.o
10 See T.G. Ison, "Re The Uses and Limitations of Sanctions in Industrial Health and Safety"
(1975) 2 Workers' Comp. R. 203.
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F. Penalty Levies
In British Columbia, the Board may also levy an additional assessment
upon an employer where a disability or death has resulted substantially
from the gross negligence of an employer or the failure of an employer
to adopt reasonable means for the prevention of disabilities or to comply
with the orders, or directors of the Board or with the regulations of
the Board."
This does not, of course, mean that the Board investigates fault
on every claim. The practice is that in some of the extreme cases of
serious neglect by an employer resulting in injury or disease, the Board
imposes an additional assessment. It is infinitely better than experience
rating in that the enquiry focusses upon the existence of hazardous
conditions. Moreover, the disadvantages of experience rating do not apply.
For example, the kinds of cases in which a penalty levy is imposed
are not the kinds of cases in which a claim is likely to be discouraged
or opposed by an employer.
II. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS
Adjustments to workers' compensation assessments have great
potential as an incentive to care if the adjustments are made as a direct
response to the existence of hazardous conditions. Indeed, such adjust-
ments are essential to the fulfillment of government responsibilities in
occupational health and safety. This requires a program of inspection
and penalty assessments, and perhaps also penalty levies. Experience
rating, however, is very damaging.
II Workers' Compensation Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 437, s. 73(2).
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